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I.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). On June 19, 2002, the trial court entered an order granting
defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Record
on Appeal ("RA"), at 543-42.) On August 6, 2002, the trial certified the dismissal of the
complaint as a final judgment. (RA 518-16.)
II,

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The issue presented by this appeal is whether the trial court correctly determined
that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution bars Utah's asserting
personal jurisdiction over Henry Taylor when (a) Taylor's only connection with Utah is
his status as an officer or director of a corporation that issued securities in Utah through
allegedly misleading information, and (b) Utah law creates a rebuttable presumption that
Taylor, merely by virtue of his status as an officer or director, may be jointly and
severally liable under Utah's securities laws. Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal.
(RA 559-52.)
Whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant under Utah law and the
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution is a question of law, which is
reviewed for "correctness." D.A. v. State (In the Interest of W.A.), 63 P.3d 607, 611
(Utah 2002). The Court may affirm the trial court's ruling "if it is sustainable on any
legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though that ground or theory was not
identified by the lower court as the basis of its ruling." Id

III.
1.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This action arises out of the July 1997 issuance of pollution control bonds

(the "Bonds") by Tooele County (the "Bond Issuance"). The Bonds were secured by a
loan agreement for which Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. ("LESI") and its
successor Safety-Kleen Corporation ("Safety-Kleen"), a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in South Carolina, was the primary obligor. (RA 22, ^j 1.)
2.

Appellants1 are institutional purchasers of the Bonds, each of which is

foreign to Utah. (RA 21,ffil4-9.)
3.

Appellants claim venue is proper in Tooele County, Utah, based upon a

forum selection clause contained in the Indenture of Trust between the County of Tooele,
as issuer, and U.S. Bank, as trustee, dated July 1, 1997. (RA 22, f 2.) None of the
individual defendants, including Henry Taylor ("Taylor"), was a party to the Indenture of
Trust. (RA 285-193.)
4.

Appellants' Complaint - the substance of which is alleged solely on

information and belief- sets forth five (5) causes of action, only three (3) of which are
pled against Taylor. In general, the Complaint alleges that the named defendants
participated in and/or aided and abetted LESI with respect to materially false statements
regarding LESI's financial condition. With respect to Taylor, the complaint alleges
causes of action under Utah Code Ann. §§61-1-1(2) and 61-1-22(4), as well as a claim

1

"Appellants" refers to MFS Series Trust III (on behalf of MFS Municipal High Income
Fund), Merrill Lynch High Yield Municipal Bond Fund, Inc., Muniholdings Fund, Inc.,
Merrill Lynch Munch Municipal Bond Fund, The National Portfolio, Merrill Lynch
Municipal Strategy Fund, Eaton Vance Distributors, Inc., T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc.,
John Hancock Funds, Inc., and Putnum Investments, Inc., collectively.

for negligent misrepresentation. (RA 10-02,fflf67-76, 77-88, 108-121.) There are no
allegations of any intentional conduct by Taylor. (Id.)
5.

Taylor is a resident of Columbia, South Carolina, and has been a resident of

South Carolina all of his life. Until November 16, 2001, Taylor was the Senior Vice
President, Secretary and General Counsel of Safety-Kleen. On November 16, 2001,
Taylor resigned his position as Senior Vice President, Secretary and General Counsel of
Safety-Kleen and now serves as Special Counsel and consultant to Safety-Kleen. (RA
185,11.)
6.

From May 1997 until January 9, 2001, Taylor held the office of Vice

President, Secretary and General Counsel of Safety-Kleen. Safety-Kleen was known as
Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. ("LESI") from May 1997 through November 24,
1998 (although LESI did business as Safety-Kleen from July 1, 1998 through November
24, 1998). From May 1990 until May 1997, Taylor served as Secretary and Vice
President, Legal Affairs of Laidlaw Environmental Services (US), Inc., renamed SafetyKleen (US), Inc. in July 1998; and thereafter merged into Safety-Kleen Services, Inc. in
September 1998. (RA 185, f 1.)
7.

Safety-Kleen maintains its principal executive offices in Columbia, South

Carolina. Currently, Safety-Kleen and 73 of its United States subsidiaries are seeking
relief in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (District of
Delaware Case No. 00-2303). (RA 185, Tf 2.)
8.

Taylor has never visited Utah for personal reasons. (RA 185-84, ^f 3.)

Taylor owns no real property in Utah, has no immediate family in Utah, and has never
conducted any personal business in Utah. Taylor is an attorney licensed in the State of

South Carolina. Taylor is not a member of the State Bar of Utah, and has never appeared
pro hac vice in any Utah court, state or federal. Taylor does not maintain a residence or
office in Utah. Taylor has never maintained any bank accounts in Utah. Taylor is not a
member of any limited partnership, general partnership, limited liability company, joint
venture, or other business entity in Utah. Taylor has never paid or owed any taxes,
including, but not limited to, income or gross receipt taxes, in or to the State of Utah.
Taylor has never been a party to any lawsuit in Utah, or otherwise availed himself of the
laws of the State of Utah. (RA 183, H 10.)
9.

All of Taylor's physical contacts with Utah have been solely in his capacity

as a corporate agent for Safety-Kleen (Clive), Inc., which is incorporated in the State of
Oklahoma. Safety-Kleen (Clive), Inc., is a subsidiary of Safety-Kleen Services, Inc.,
which, in turn, is a subsidiary of Safety-Kleen. Taylor was Secretary of Safety-Kleen
(Clive), Inc., from approximately January 1, 1995, through March 17, 2000. From
approximately March 17, 2000, through approximately November 16, 2001, Taylor was
President and director of Safety-Kleen (Clive), Inc. (RA 185-84, ^ 3.)
10.

As part of Taylor's corporate duties on behalf of Safety-Kleen (Clive), Inc.,

to the best of Taylor's recollection, he has made only one (1) trip to Utah. Taylor
believes this trip occurred in or around May of 1995, and involved a trip to Safety-Kleen
(Clive), Inc.'s incineration facility in Clive, Utah (since he had never seen it), and a
meeting with various Utah regulators concerning new management of this facility. This
trip to Utah involved no personal business for Taylor. (RA 184, *| 4.)
11.

Other than Taylor's one trip to Utah on behalf of Safety-Kleen (Clive), Inc.,

he does not recall ever traveling to Utah on behalf of any other entity related to Safety-

d

Kleen, including Safety-Kleen itself. The Bond Issuance underlying this litigation had
nothing to do with Safety-Kleen (Clive), Inc. (RA 184, f 5.)
12.

Taylor has not been to Utah in any capacity since his last visit here in or

about May 1995. (RA 184, | 6.)
13.

Safety-Kleen currently has two (2) subsidiaries that are limited liability

companies organized under the laws of the State of Utah - SK Services, L.C, and SK
Services (East), L.C. Taylor previously served as Secretary of these Utah limited liability
companies, although existing corporate records do not reflect the entire period of time
during which Taylor held such position. (RA 184, ^f 7.)
14.

Safety-Kleen previously had two other subsidiaries organized or

incorporated in Utah - ECDC Environmental, L.C, and East Carbon Development
Financial Partners, Inc. The first of these corporations was sold in approximately
November of 1997, and the second was merged into Safety-Kleen (US), Inc., in August
1998. Taylor does not believe he ever served as an officer or manager of these
companies, and no corporate records reviewed by Taylor show that he was ever listed as
such. (RA 184, If 8.)
15.

None of the four (4) Utah-based subsidiaries of Safety-Kleen referred to

above were involved in the Bond Issuance underlying the instant civil action. Taylor
does not recall ever traveling to Utah on behalf of any of these entities. (RA 183,19.)
16.

Taylor never spoke with any representative of the Appellants in this action

with respect to the Bond Issuance. At the time of the Bond Issuance, Taylor had no basis
to know that any of the Appellants in this action had any connection to Utah. Taylor
never personally attended any meetings in Utah pertaining to the Bond Issuance. (RA

183, f 11.) Indeed, Taylor's role in the issuance of the bonds that are the subject matter
of the current litigation was limited to acts taken solely in his capacity as corporate Vice
President, Secretary, and/or General Counsel for Safety-Kleen, as follows:
•

On or about July 9, 2001, Taylor affixed his signature to the
General Certificate of Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. for
the purpose of identifying himself as the General Counsel for and
an Authorized Borrower Representative of LESI.

•

On June 3, 1997, acting in his corporate capacity as Secretary of
LESI, Taylor affixed his signature to a Certificate of Change of
Registered Agent and Registered Office (the "Registered Agent
Certificate"), attesting to LESI's designation of The Corporation
Trust Company as its registered agent. A copy of the Registered
Agent Certificate was included as an exhibit to the General
Certificate of Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. in
connection with the Bond Issuance.

•

The Loan Agreement between LESI and Tooele County, Utah,
which is dated July 1, 1997, also bears Taylor's signature in his
corporate capacity as Vice President, General Counsel, and
Secretary. The sole purpose of this signature was to attest to the
signature of Paul R. Humphreys, the Senior Vice President and
Chief Financial Officer of LESI.

•

On or about July 9, 1997, in his capacity as General Counsel for
LESI, Taylor caused to be delivered a letter in which he
expressed certain opinions pursuant to Section 7(c)(1) of the July
2, 1997 Bond Placement Agreement. Importantly, however, the
July 9, 1997 letter specifically exempts from its coverage any
opinions or representations regarding certain portions of the
Offering Memorandum, including the financial statements of
LESI contained in the Offering Memorandum.

(RA 183-82, ffl 12-15; RA 191-88.)
IV.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This Court should affirm the trial court's judgment, if only because Appellants
failed to marshal evidence supporting the dismissal of Henry Taylor. This appeal is
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based entirely on the misguided argument that Taylor is subject to Utah jurisdiction
solely because Appellants have sued him under Utah's securities laws. Alleged liability,
and personal jurisdiction, are distinct. By focusing solely on alleged liability, Appellants
ask this Court to ignore the constitutional due process principles at the heart of personal
jurisdiction analysis. Allowing Utah to exercise jurisdiction over Taylor, simply because
Utah has enacted a statute purportedly creating presumptive liability against Taylor
because of his status as an officer of a corporation, would impermissibly deprive Taylor
of due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
Thus, notwithstanding Appellants' lengthy discussion of Taylor's alleged liability
under Utah's securities laws, the issue before this Court is straightforward - whether
Utah's assertion of personal jurisdiction over Taylor violates due process of law. It does.
Appellants have offered no evidence to meet their burden of demonstrating that Taylor, a
resident of South Carolina, personally and purposefully availed himself of the privilege
of transacting business in Utah such that the exercise of jurisdiction over Taylor would
comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Indeed, the only
evidence alleged by Appellants is merely that Taylor was an officer of LESI at the time
of the Bond Issuance, and that Taylor signed various documents in connection with the
Bond Issuance in his corporate capacity. But those simple acts are legally insufficient to
establish personal jurisdiction over Taylor in his individual capacity.
Even if Taylor's alleged corporate contacts with Utah were considered by the
Court, those contacts have nothing to do with the alleged financial misrepresentations
upon which Appellants base their entire complaint. Tellingly, Appellants' complaint

contains no allegations of intentional conduct by Taylor in connection with the alleged
financial misrepresentations.
Taylor, therefore, respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court's order
dismissing the complaint against him for lack of personal jurisdiction.
V,

ARGUMENT

This Court recently clarified the test for determining whether personal jurisdiction
exists over a nonresident defendant. It stated:
The proper test to be applied in determining whether personal
jurisdiction exists over a nonresident defendant involves two
considerations. First, the court must assess whether Utah law
confers personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.
This means that a court may rely on any Utah statute
affording it personal jurisdiction, not just Utah's long-arm
statute. Second, assuming Utah law confers personal
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant, the court must
assess whether an assertion of jurisdiction comports with the
due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.
D.A., 63 P.3d at 612; see Arguello v. Indus. Woodworking Mach. Co., 838 P.2d 1120,
1122 (Utah 1992) ("Generally, whether a state can exercise specific jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant is determined by two factors: the breadth of the forum state's
jurisdictional statute and the due process limitations on jurisdiction imposed by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution."). See also Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-22 (long-arm statute authorizing jurisdiction to the "extent permitted by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution").
Accordingly, Utah courts "frequently make a due process analysis first because any set of
circumstances that satisfies due process will also satisfy the long-arm statute." SII
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MegaDiamond, Inc. v. Am. Superabrasives Corp., 969 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1998); see
Arguello, 838 P.2d at 1122-23.
Utah follows federal precedent. "To exercise jurisdiction consistent with due
process, the nonresident defendant must have 'minimum contacts with the forum state
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.5" Arguello, 838 P.2d at 1123 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). "In order to determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice, [the Utah Supreme Court] has recognized that 'the central concern of the inquiry
into personal jurisdiction is the relationship of the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation, to each other.'" Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106, 1110
(Utah 1985) (quoting Mallory Eng'g v. Ted R. Brown & Assoc, 618 P.2d 1004, 1007
(Utah 1980)). The assessment of that relationship involves determining "whether the
defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." IcL (emphasis
added) (internal quotation omitted); see SII MegaDiamond, 969 P.2d at 437 (quoting
Asahi Metal Indus Co., v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987)) ("a finding of
minimum contacts must come about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed
toward the forum state"). In addition, the cause of action must arise out of or have a
substantial connection with the activities within the forum state. Synergetics, 701 P.2d at
1110; see SII MegaDiamond, 969 P.2d at 437 (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319) ("the
contested obligations must 'arise out of and be connected with the activities of the forum
state5"). "Finally, 'the determination of whether Utah can justify asserting personal

jurisdiction over defendants hinges on the balancing of the fairness to the parties and the
interests of the State in asserting jurisdiction.'" SII MegaDiamond, 969 P.2d at 435
(quoting Synergetics, 701 P.2d at 1110-11).
Appellants do not and cannot allege that Taylor engaged in any conduct directed at
or in Utah. Appellants argue only that Utah courts have specific jurisdiction over Taylor,
conceding that Utah courts lack general jurisdiction over Taylor. (Appellants' Opening
Brief ("Appellants' Op. Br."), at 14.) "Specific jurisdiction gives a court power over a
defendant only with respect to claims arising out of the particular activities of the
defendant in the forum state. For such jurisdiction to exist, the defendant must have
certain minimum local contacts." Arguello, 838 P.2d at 1122.
Importantly, Appellants "bear[] the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction"
over Taylor, Far West Capital Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1075 (10th Cir. 1995). See
also Pellegrini v. Sachs & Sons, 522 P.2d 704, 708 (Utah 1974). Where, as here, Taylor
supports a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction with affidavit testimony,
Appellants must make a prima facie showing of proper jurisdiction by affirmative
evidence. See Anderson v. Am. Soc'v of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons, 807 P.2d
825, 827 (Utah 1990). No such rebuttal was offered or attempted here.
As demonstrated below, Appellants failed to meet their burden, and thus this Court
should affirm the trial court's decision.
A.

Appellants Failed To Marshal Evidence.
Contrary to Appellants' statement on page 2 of their brief, that the trial court's

ruling was "based on documentary evidence alone," the trial court relied, in part, on
affidavits, including the affidavit of defendant and appellee Henry Taylor. Under Utah
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law, appellants were required to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's ruling.
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). This
failure to marshal unrebutted evidence dooms this appeal.
B.

Regardless Of How Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4) And Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-1-26(8) Are Construed, Neither Can Be Read To Confer Personal
Jurisdiction Over Taylor.
Appellants set forth the following rationale for why personal jurisdiction over all

of the individual defendants is proper:
(1) securities were issued or caused to be issued in Utah by
LES; (2) the securities were offered and sold to Appellants by
way of false or misleading statements; and (3) Appellees were
directors and officers of LES at the time of the Issuance.
(Appellants' Op. Br., at 18.) Based on these facts, Appellants contend that defendants
"are presumed by [Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4)] to have knowingly or negligently
committed a tort having effects in this state, thereby satisfying the 'minimum contacts'
test for jurisdiction." (Appellants' Op. Br., at 46.) Indeed, Appellants' arguments are
based solely on defendants presumed, rather than actual, acts. (Appellants' Op. Br., at
16-18, 28-32.) Appellants then argue that through Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-26, the Utah
Legislature intended to confer personal jurisdiction over all persons potentially liable
under Utah's securities laws, including those persons presumptively liable under Utah
Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4). (Appellants' Op. Br., at 36-38.) Thus, Appellants reason, the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendants is entirely proper.
Appellants confuse liability with jurisdiction, ignore due process requirements,
and thus erroneously rely on Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4) and § 61-1-26.

1.

Because Liability Is Distinct From Jurisdiction, It Is Not Enough For
Appellants Merely To Show That Taylor Is Presumptively Liable
Under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4).

Without considering personal jurisdiction issues, the Utah Legislature enacted
Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-22(4)(a), which provides:
Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller or
buyer liable under Subsection (1), every partner, officer, or
director of such a seller or buyer, every person occupying a
similar status or performing similar functions, every
employee of such a seller or buyer who materially aids in the
sale or purchase, and every broker-dealer or agent who
materially aids in the sale are also liable jointly and severally
with and to the same extent as the seller or purchaser, unless
the nonseller or nonpurchaser who is so liable sustains the
burden of proof that he did not know, and in exercise of
reasonable care could not have known, of the existence of the
facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist.
Nothing in this section indicates any intent on the part of the Utah Legislature to subject
officers or directors to personal jurisdiction in Utah. By its terms, Utah Code Ann. §61l-22(4)(a) merely creates a rebuttable presumption that Taylor, as an officer of LESI at
the time of the Bond Issuance, is liable under Utah's securities laws. However, alleged
liability and purposefully availing oneself of a state's laws are qualitatively and legally
different.
Merely because Taylor may be presumed liable does not mean that he is subject to
personal jurisdiction in Utah. "Liability and jurisdiction are independent. Liability
depends on the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants and between the
individual defendants; jurisdiction depends only upon each defendant's relationship with
the forum." Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1365 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Shaffer v.
Heitaer, 433 U.S. 186, 204 & n.19 (1977)). Thus, regardless of the defendants' potential
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joint liability, "jurisdiction over each defendant must be established individually." Id.
(citing Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980)).
Based on these fundamental principles, the court in Sher found that it lacked
personal jurisdiction over individual partners, even though the court had jurisdiction over
the partnership and the partners were jointly and severally liable for the obligations of the
partnership. Sher, 911 F.2d at 1365-66. Similarly, the court in American Telephone &
Telegraph Company v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1996),
found that it lacked jurisdiction over a defendant's parent corporation even though that
corporation was liable for environmental cleanup costs under federal law. Id at 590-91
("Even if [the parent corporation] would be liable under CERCLA, AT&T may not use
liability as a substitute for personal jurisdiction. . . . [Liability is not to be conflated with
amenability to suit in a particular forum."). Other cases have also found that liability is
no substitute for jurisdiction. See Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Ever Best Ltd., 28 F.3d 910, 915
(8th Cir. 1994) ("Generally, when the corporate veil is pierced, the individuals may be
liable for the corporation's actions. Whether an individual is subject to the jurisdiction of
a federal court is a separate threshold issue, which the district court conflated with the
issue of the individuals' liability for corporate actions.") (internal citation omitted);
Langloisv.DeiaVu,Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1327, 1334 (W.D. Wash. 1997) ("Even if a
congressional statute paints as broad a liability stroke as possible, the individuals subject
to liability under such statute would still only be amenable to suit in the jurisdiction
where it would be 'fair' to call them into court." To hold otherwise would "knock heads
with the United States Constitution.").

All of these cases are analogous to the situation here, where Appellants have
argued that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Taylor because Taylor is
presumptively liable under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22. As in the above cases, however,
Appellants may not use liability as a substitute for personal jurisdiction. While neither
the Utah state or federal courts nor the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed the
issue decided by the Ninth Circuit in Sher and American Telephone & Telegraph
Company, the rule of those cases has been favorably cited by other federal courts in the
Tenth Circuit. See SBKC Serv. Corp. v. 1111 Prospect Partners, L.P., 969 F. Supp. 1254,
1260 (D. Kan. 1997), affirmed in part and vacated in part, 153 F.3d 728 (10th Cir. 1998)
(finding, based on the Sher court's "well reasoned analysis," that the court lacked
jurisdiction over the general partner even though it had jurisdiction over the partnership).
In addition, several courts have applied the fundamental distinction between
liability and jurisdiction to situations where, as here, control persons are alleged to be
liable under the applicable securities laws. In Schlatter v. Mo-Comm Futures, Ltd., 662
P.2d 553 (1983), the Kansas Supreme Court found that no personal jurisdiction existed
over two directors of a corporation that allegedly sold securities based on false and
misleading statements. In so holding, the court specifically rejected the argument that
because the directors were presumptively liable under Kansas Stat. Ann. § 17-1268(b) Kansas Stat. Ann. § 17-1268(b) provides:
Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller liable under
subsection (a), every partner, officer, or director (or person occupying a
similar status or performing similar functions) or employee of such a seller
who materially aids in the sale, and every broker-dealer or agent who
materially aids in the sale is also liable jointly and severally with and to the
same extent as the seller, unless the nonseller who is so liable sustains the
burden of proof that such nonseller did not know, and in the exercise of
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which is nearly identical to Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4) - they necessarily were subject
to jurisdiction in Kansas. Id. at 563. "It is true that the statute establishes the basis for
liability of persons involved in the sale of unregistered securities but it does not establish
the jurisdiction of the court to submit such persons to liability." Id. The court proceeded
to find that the corporate directors lacked the minimum contacts with Kansas "necessary
to satisfy federal constitutional due process requirements." Id.
Similarly, in Taylor-Rush v. Multitech Corp., 265 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1990), the
plaintiffs alleged that personal jurisdiction existed over corporate officers and directors
based on allegations of their control person liability under California Corporations Code
§ 25504 - the California equivalent of Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-22(4).3 Id at 677 & n.3.
The court rejected this argument, and found that no minimum contacts existed because

reasonable care could not have known, of the existence of the facts by
reason of which the liability is alleged to exist. There is contribution as in
cases of contract among the several persons so liable.
3

California Corporations Code § 25504 provides:
Every person who directly or indirectly controls a person liable under
Section 25501 or 25503, every partner in a firm so liable, every principal
executive officer or director of a corporation so liable, every person
occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, every employee
of a person so liable who materially aids in the act or transaction
constituting the violation, and every broker-dealer or agent who materially
aids in the act or transaction constituting the violation, are also liable jointly
and severally with and to the same extent as such person, unless the other
person who is so liable had no knowledge of or reasonable grounds to
believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is
alleged to exist.

"[t]here is no evidence that they participated in or directed any tortious acts or omission
either within or without California." Id. at 678.4
Finally, the court in In Re Baan Co. Securities Litigation, 81 F. Supp. 2d 75
(D.D.C. 2000) rejected the argument that a showing of control person liability under
federal securities acts was sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the control person, stating
that such a theory "goes too far." Id at 79-82. In a subsequent opinion, the court in In re
Baan reiterated its earlier ruling, again rejected jurisdiction based solely on an allegation
of control person liability, and noted that such an approach "impermissibly conflates
statutory liability with the Constitution's command that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction must be fundamentally fair." In re Baan, 245 F. Supp. 2d 117, 129 (D.D.C.
2003).
2.

Appellants' Cases Are Unavailing.

The cases relied upon by Appellants do not inform a decision here. Appellants
rely heavily on San Mateo County Transit District v. Fitzgerald, 979 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir.
1992), for the proposition that personal jurisdiction over an individual exists "if the
plaintiff makes a non-frivolous allegation that the defendant controlled a person liable for
the fraud." (Appellants5 Op. Br., at 26.) While at first glance the Ninth Circuit's ruling
in San Mateo may seem to support Appellants' position, further examination reveals that
San Mateo has no application here.
In San Mateo, the plaintiff sought to hold the Treasurer and Vice President of a
brokerage firm, as well as the brokerage firm itself, liable under the federal Securities Act
4

In a case with many of the same parties to the present appeal, the California Court of
Appeal recently rejected the very same arguments made by Appellants here. The
decision was not published.

16

of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 et seq. San Mateo, 979 F.2d at 1357. The officer moved to
dismiss on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. Id.
Specifically, the officer argued that he was not a "controlling person" within the meaning
of Section 20(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a), and therefore the court lacked
jurisdiction over him under the Securities Act. San Mateo, 979 F.2d at 1357. The trial
court agreed with the officer, and granted his motion to dismiss. Id.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that jurisdiction over the officer existed
because the plaintiff had made a sufficient showing of potential liability as a control
person under Section 20(a) of the Securities Act. Id. at 1357-58. To reach this
conclusion, the Ninth Circuit examined the provision of the Securities Act dealing with
service of process, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa. The Ninth Circuit concluded that because the
Securities Act authorized worldwide service of process and permitted jurisdiction over
the defendant "wherever he may be found," the district court improperly dismissed the
officer for lack of personal jurisdiction. San Mateo, 979 F.2d at 1358.
Notably, however, the court in San Mateo did not engage in a due process analysis
to determine whether the officer had sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state.
Id. at 1357-58. Indeed, such an analysis would have been improper, since the officer was
being accused, in federal court, of violating a federal statute.
'Minimum contacts' with a particular district or state for
purposes of personal jurisdiction is not a limitation imposed
on the federal courts in a federal question case by due process
concerns. The Constitution does not require the federal
districts to follow state boundaries. It is clear that Congress
can provide for nationwide service of process in federal court
for federal question cases without falling short of the
requirements of due process.

Sec. Investor Prot Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309,1315 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other
grounds, Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992) (quoting Johnson v.
Creative Arts & Wool Masters, Inc., 743 F.2d 947, 950 (1st Cir. 1984)) (emphasis in
original). Thus, because Section 27 of the Securities Act authorizes worldwide service of
process, the question of whether a federal court has personal jurisdiction over a particular
party "becomes whether the party has sufficient contacts with the United States, not any
particular state." Vigman, 764 F.2d at 1315-16.
This distinction in the minimum contacts analysis under the federal securities laws
is critical to understanding why the holding in San Mateo does not support Appellants'
position. There was no dispute in San Mateo as to whether the officer had sufficient
minimum contacts with the United States. Whether the officer had sufficient minimum
contacts with California was irrelevant, because the only dispute was whether the
plaintiff had adequately stated a claim for liability under the Securities Act. Under the
specific facts presented in San Mateo, therefore, the issues of liability and personal
jurisdiction were one and the same. That is not so here.
The personal jurisdiction analysis applied in San Mateo is far different from the
analysis where, as here, a state court's jurisdiction rests on a state long-arm statute. See
Vigman, 764 F.2d at 1315 (noting that the line of cases flowing from International Shoe
apply where the issue involves a state court's jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant).
In such cases, the state court must determine whether the defendant purposefully
established sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state. Id.
As a result of this difference, it is unfortunate, although perhaps not surprising,
that the court in San Mateo found that "[i]f the suit is to enforce a liability created by the
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Securities Act, the [district] court has jurisdiction over the defendant wherever he may be
found." San Mateo, 979 F.2d at 1358. But as at least one court has correctly noted, this
one sentence from San Mateo, if "read to permit the exercise of jurisdiction based on no
more than an allegation that the defendant controlled the entity which performed that act
complained of," is "utterly inconsistent with the persistent insistence of the Supreme
Court. .. that personal jurisdiction be premised on a showing that the defendant has, by
his acts, purposefully availed himself of the forum's benefits." In Re Baan, 81 F. Supp.
2d at 81-82 (internal citation omitted); see In re Baan, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 129 ("it simply
goes too far to hold, as the Ninth Circuit did in San Mateo, that mere control status is
sufficient to create personal jurisdiction"). The language of San Mateo upon which
Appellants rely, therefore, must be specifically limited to the facts and law before the
court in that case. San Mateo, therefore, does not and should not support Appellants'
position here.
Appellants' reliance on other federal district court cases decided under the federal
Securities Act is similarly misplaced. (See Appellants' Op. Br., at 43-45.) In the cases
cited by Appellants - each of which deals with the issue of whether a defendant foreign
to the United States could be subject to suit within the United States - the federal court
simply did not conclude that an individual's presumed liability as a control person was
sufficient to confer jurisdiction over those individuals. Instead, in each case the federal
court carefully examined the culpable conduct of each individual defendant involved to
determine whether each defendant had purposefully established sufficient minimum
contacts with the United States. In Re Baan, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 79-82 (carefully analyzing
the cases cited by Appellants here, and concluding that each of the cases "required more

than the allegation that defendant controlled the entity which performed the act claimed
to have violated the pertinent securities law before asserting jurisdiction over its person");
see McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals, Ltd., 46 F. Supp. 2d 628, 640-41 (E.D. Tex. 1999)
(separately analyzing culpable conduct of each individual defendant to determine whether
jurisdiction was proper); Derensis v. Coopers & Lvbrand Chartered Accountants. 930 F.
Supp. 1003, 1014 (D.N.J. 1996) (sustaining exercise of jurisdiction over individuals
based on allegation that "they approved and disseminated financial statements that they
knew would influence the price of Nesmont securities on the NASDAQ market"); Landry
v. Price Waterhouse Chartered Accountants, 715 F. Supp. 98, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(finding that jurisdiction over individual defendant was proper because he was a "behind
the scenes player" in the transaction).
Accordingly, the cases cited by Appellants offer no support for their assertion that
the issues of liability and jurisdiction are one and the same. Thus, Appellants' allegations
that Taylor is presumptively liable under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4) are, by
themselves, insufficient to state a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction over Taylor.
3.

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-26 Is Merely A Service Of Process Statute And
Does Not Provide An Independent Basis For Jurisdiction.

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-26 provides, in pertinent part:
When any person, including any nonresident of this state,
engages in conduct prohibited or made actionable by this
chapter or any rule or order hereunder, and he has not filed a
consent to service of process under Subsection (7) and
personal jurisdiction over him cannot otherwise be obtained
in this state, that conduct shall be considered equivalent to his
appointment of the division or the director to be his attorney
to receive service of any lawful process in any noncriminal
suit, action, or proceeding against him or his successor
executor or administrator which grows out of that conduct
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and which is brought under this chapter or any rule or order
hereunder, with the same force and validity as if served on
him personally.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-26(8)(a).
Appellants argue that this provision grants Utah courts personal jurisdiction to
enforce Utah's securities laws in any case where an individual is presumptively liable
under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4). (Appellants' Op. Br., at 36-38.) Appellants read
this statute much too broadly, and ignore the due process issues at the heart of any
jurisdictional analysis.
As recently explained by the Utah Supreme Court:
[A]ny legislative enactment of personal jurisdiction, in or
out of the long-arm statute, cannot justify on its own the
assertion of jurisdiction. The true safeguard on the
extension of personal jurisdiction is the constitutional due
process analysis, with its focus on minimum contacts and
on traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Therefore, this test recognizes the legislature's authority to
provide for the extension of personal jurisdiction as limited
by established constitutional due process requirements.
D A , 63 P.3d at 612 (emphasis added). Accordingly, regardless of who the Utah
Legislature intended to reach through Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-26(8), the exercise of
jurisdiction over any person still must comport with due process.
Other courts have properly rejected attempts to utilize broad service of process
statutes as a basis for jurisdiction. See Tri-West Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Seguros Monterrey
Aetna, S.A., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 78, 80 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting the plaintiffs
argument that personal jurisdiction existed in light of a broad service of process statute,
and finding that before service of process statutes may be utilized to obtain jurisdiction
over a nonresident, the power to exercise jurisdiction must be found to exist and must be

consistent with due process); Bank of Am. v. Nat'l Trust and Sav. Ass'n v. GAC Props.
Credit, Inc., 389 A.2d 1304, 1309 (Del. Ch. 1978) (explaining that a state's service of
process statutes can only be applied to obtain jurisdiction over nonresident defendants
where such nonresidents have constitutionally sufficient minimum contacts with the
forum state); In re Baan, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 126 (noting that the service of process statute
under the Securities Exchange Act, providing for service of process "wherever the
defendant may be found," does not end the jurisdictional inquiry. "[T]he court's
assertion of personal jurisdiction must, as always, comport with the requirements of the
Constitution.")
The two state cases relied upon by Appellants are unpersuasive and
distinguishable. (Appellants' Op. Br., at 37-38.) Neither case stands for the proposition
that a service of process statute is sufficient, in and of itself, to confer personal
jurisdiction over officers or directors when their corporations sell securities in the forum
state.
In the first case, an unpublished decision from the Massachusetts Superior Court,
personal jurisdiction was found proper over the CEO and majority shareholder of a
company that sold shares based on representations that the company would obtain and
manage wireless cable television stations. American Microtek Inc. v. Massachusetts, No.
93-5874, 1995 Mass. Super. LEXIS 593, at *28-30 (Apr. 10, 1995). The court found that
jurisdiction existed over the CEO of the corporation based on an administrative finding,
supported by the CEO's testimony, that the CEO controlled the corporation. Id The
court then stated, without analysis, that because the CEO controlled the corporation,
jurisdiction over him could be obtained through the service of process provisions in
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Massachusetts' securities laws. Id. Here, there has been no finding or even allegation
that Taylor controlled LESI. In fact, Appellants have not submitted any evidence that
Taylor actually controlled LESI generally or controlled the Bond Issuance specifically.
Absent such evidence, or any other evidence showing Taylor's minimum contacts with
Utah, the service of process statue is entirely irrelevant. In any event, to the extent
American Microtel can be read to support Appellants' argument that a state can exercise
jurisdiction over individuals by creating presumptive liability and enacting a broad
service of process statute, it is inconsistent with the holdings of the Utah Supreme Court
and the United States Supreme Court, as explained at length throughout this brief.
The second state case relied on by Appellants is equally unavailing. In that case,
an investment broker in South Carolina brokered the sale of shares in a Louisiana oil well
held by two foreign corporations, Summit and Cajun. Brown v. Inv. Mgmt. & Research,
Inc., 475 S.E.2d 754, 755 (S.C. 1996). The court based its finding of jurisdiction on its
acceptance of the facts as pled in the complaint, which alleged that the defendants
transacted business in the state through its investment broker, made fraudulent
misrepresentations through that broker, and sold securities in the state. IcL at 757.
Importantly, the court did not tie or equate jurisdiction over the officers and/or directors
of the defendant corporations because of their joint and several liability under South
Carolina's securities laws. In fact, the officers and directors of the defendant
corporations were not even defendants in the lawsuit. Id, at 755. The only individual
defendants before the court were the direct agents of the defendant corporations, and
those individuals were allegedly liable and subject to jurisdiction for their own
affirmative acts in selling securities in South Carolina. Id at 755, 757-58. And, because

the individuals had engaged in these affirmative acts, they were subject to service under
South Carolina's service of process statute. Id. at 757. In other words, the service of
process statutes only became relevant to the jurisdictional analysis after the defendants
were found to have engaged in sufficient acts directed at the forum state. Id Brown,
therefore, does not support Appellants' argument.
Accordingly, Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-26(8) - a service of process statute - cannot
and should not provide the basis for jurisdiction over Taylor here unless the exercise of
such jurisdiction otherwise comports with due process. As demonstrated below,
however, Appellants failed to and could not make this showing.
C.

Appellants Have Failed To Establish That Taylor Has Sufficient Minimum
Contacts With Utah Such That Asserting Jurisdiction Over Him Would
Comport With Due Process.
Once this Court properly focuses on the due process analysis and applies the facts,

it will find that Taylor lacks sufficient minimum contacts with Utah. Thus, asserting
jurisdiction over him would violate due process. Contrary to Appellants' arguments,
minimum contacts cannot be established by presumed acts, and cannot be established
based on the acts of others.
1.

Appellants Have Failed To Establish That Taylor Purposefully Availed
Himself Of The Privilege Of Conducting Personal Business In Utah.

Taylor had no contacts with Utah in his personal capacity. (RA 185-83,fflf3-6,
10.) Moreover, while Taylor was an officer and/or director of various Safety-Kleen
subsidiaries incorporated in Utah, those subsidiaries were not involved in the Bond
Issuance, and have no connection with the financial statements underlying Appellants'
complaint. (RA 185-83,fflf3-9.) Finally, Appellants have not offered any evidence that
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Taylor committed any intentional act that was expressly aimed at Utah. Significantly,
Appellants do not even allege that Taylor made any intentional misrepresentation or
committed any intentional act expressly aimed at Utah. To the contrary, the allegations
against Taylor are based solely on untargeted, unintentional acts, and alleged negligence.
(RA 10-02, Yl 67-76, 77-88, 108-121.)
At most, therefore, Appellants can establish that Taylor, in his capacity as an
officer or General Counsel of Safety-Kleen, signed a few documents in connection with
the Bond Issuance. (RA 183-82, ^f 12-15.) By signing various documents in his
corporate capacity, however, Taylor in no way "purposefully availed himself of the
privilege of conducting personal activities in Utah. See LeDuc v. Ky. Cent. Life Ins. Co.,
814 F. Supp. 820, 824-25 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (rejecting assertion that directors of
corporation purposefully availed themselves of the California forum where the directors
signed agency contracts which assisted the corporation in developing further business in
California); Am. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. First Am. Title Co. of Utah 772 F. Supp. 574,
579 (D. Utah 1991) (where individual's contact with Utah was as an agent for client, such
contact cannot be considered "purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting
activities in Utah" for purposes of establishing jurisdiction over such individual);
Goehring v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 105, 112-14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (by
signing various documents related to the transaction at issue, including a sales agreement,
a security agreement, an escrow agreement, and a UCC financing statement, the partners
did not purposefully establish minimum contacts with California). See also Dobbs v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 39 F.3d 1064, 1068 (10th Cir. 1994) (affirming dismissal of claims
against individuals based on lack of general or specific jurisdiction over corporate

employees where actions in forum state were minor and presence in the forum state was
at the direction of the employer); Seagate Tech. v. A.J. Kogvo Co., 268 Cal. Rptr. 586,
590-91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) ("no personal contact would result from doing nothing more
than ratifying an act taken by the corporation or another corporate officer").
Although it is not entirely clear, Appellants apparently argue that when LESI
issued the bonds in Utah, it must have been acting as Taylor's agent as well as the agent
of the other individual defendants. (See Appellants5 Op. Br., at 29, 31-32.) Tellingly,
Appellants provide no legal support for their argument that a corporation acts as an agent
for its officers and directors, or that officers and directors act as agents for one another,
for purposes of constitutional due process analysis. In fact, just the opposite is true.
It is well-established that "[e]ach defendant's contacts with the forum State must
be assessed individually," Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 782, n.13
(1984), and that the assertion of jurisdiction over one defendant based on the activities of
another would be "plainly unconstitutional." Rush, 444 U.S. at 331-32 (the requirements
of International Shoe "must be met as to each defendant"). Indeed, the purposeful
availment requirement ensures that a party will not be haled into court "solely as a result
of 'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated' contacts, or of the 'unilateral activity of another
party or a third person.'" Burger King Corp. v. Radzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)
(internal citations omitted). Thus, an individual's contacts with the forum state are not to
be judged according to his or her employer's in-forum activities. Calder v. Jones, 465
U.S. 783, 790 (1984). Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has specifically ruled that an
individual's mere status as an officer of a corporation is insufficient to give rise to
personal jurisdiction over that individual. SII MegaDiamond, 969 P.2d at 437 (finding

that Utah lacked jurisdiction over two officers of the defendant corporation). Contrary to
Appellants' suggestions, therefore, the acts of LESI and/or Safety-Kleen are entirely
irrelevant to the question of whether Utah can assume personal jurisdiction over Taylor.
Appellants additionally suggest that because Taylor should have foreseen being
subject to potential liability in Utah as an officer of LESI, he necessarily and purposefully
availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in Utah when he signed various
documents related to the Bond Issuance in his corporate capacity. In demonstrating
purposeful availment for jurisdiction purposes, however, "the mere fact that [the
defendant] can 'foresee' that [his conduct will] have an effect in [the forum state] is not
sufficient for an assertion of jurisdiction." Calder, 465 U.S. at 789. Likewise,
the mere allegation that an out-of-state defendant has
tortiously interfered with contractual rights or has committed
other business torts that have allegedly injured a forum
resident does not necessarily establish that the defendant
possesses the constitutionally required minimum contacts.
Instead, in order to resolve the jurisdictional question, a court
must undertake a particularized inquiry as to the extent to
which the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the
benefits of the forum's laws.
Far West Capital 46 F.3d at 1079.
Accordingly, Appellants have failed to prove that Taylor purposefully availed
himself of the privilege of conducting activities in Utah.
2.

Appellants' Claims Do Not Arise Out Of Or Have A Substantial
Connection With Taylor's Limited Corporate Contacts With Utah.

Appellants do not dispute that Taylor signed only a few documents in relation to
the Bond Issuance. Moreover, and more importantly, Appellants do not contend that
their claims "arise out o f or have a "substantial connection with" those documents.

Indeed, any such contention would be frivolous. Appellants' complaint, by its terms,
predicates liability on claims of false and misleading financial information, yet
Appellants have not alleged that Taylor personally made any such misstatements or that
Taylor engaged in any intentional conduct. (RA 10-02,ffi[ 67-76, 77-88,108-121.) The
absence of such allegations is not surprising because, in none of the documents signed by
Taylor in connection with the Bond Issuance, does Taylor either explicitly or implicitly
attest to LESI's financial condition. (RA 183-82,fflf 12-15.)
Of the few documents signed by Taylor, the only document even remotely
connected with Appellants' allegations of material misrepresentations is Taylor's opinion
letter dated July 9, 1997. (RA 183-82,ffi[12-15.) That letter, which Taylor wrote in his
capacity as General Counsel of LESI, was delivered to Utah as part of the bond
transaction closing documents. In that letter, however, Taylor specifically indicated he
was not expressing any opinion regarding the LESI financial statements, or the financial
state of LESI generally. (RA 182, \ 15; RA 191-88.) Thus, even if Taylor's acts in his
corporate capacity were considered to be acts by which Taylor purposefully availed
himself of the privilege of conducting activities in Utah, Appellants cannot prove that
their claims "arise out o f or have "substantial connection with" Taylor's letter of July 9,
1997, or any of the other documents signed by Taylor in connection with the Bond
Issuance. Certainly, Taylor could not have reasonably anticipated that signing these
documents would have subjected him to being hauled into court in Utah to defend against
allegations regarding alleged misrepresentations of LESI's financial condition. Those
contacts had nothing to do with the alleged misrepresentations regarding LESFs financial
condition that form the basis of Appellants' claims in this lawsuit.
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Appellants' claims against Taylor, therefore, arise out of the mere fact that Taylor
was an officer of LESI at the time the Bonds were issued. But, as explained, that is not
enough to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Taylor. See SII
MegaDiamond, 969 P.2d at 437.
3.

Appellants' Reliance On Taylor's "Presumed" Contacts With Utah Is
Misplaced, Since Basing Personal Jurisdiction on Presumed Acts
Would Violate Due Process.

Appellants do not and cannot dispute that Taylor has no personal contacts with
Utah, or that his only acts connected to Utah were taken in his corporate capacity.
Appellants nevertheless seek to avoid the substantial inadequacy of their evidentiary
showing by arguing that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4), Taylor and the other
individual defendants are presumed to have committed tortious acts causing effects in
Utah. Appellants' argument ignores fundamental due process principles at the heart of
the jurisdictional analysis.
As the Utah Supreme Court has recognized, "specific person jurisdiction arises
only out of the actual transactions between the defendant and the forum state." SII
MegaDiamond, 969 P.2d at 437 (emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court has
similarly recognized that jurisdiction is proper only where the contacts with the forum
state "proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that create a 'substantial
connection' with the forum state." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (emphasis in original);
see Asahi Metal 480 U.S. at 112 ("A finding of minimum contacts must come about by
an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum state") (emphasis
added).

The above is true regardless of the Utah Legislature's apparent intent to hold
officers and directors individually liable under its securities laws. The Utah Legislature
cannot circumvent the due process protections of the United States Constitution. See
D.A., 63 P.3d at 612. Indeed, if "presumed" acts could serve as the basis for specific
jurisdiction, then a state could easily avoid the limits on jurisdiction imposed by the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Specifically, if Appellants' argument
were correct, any state legislature could exercise jurisdiction over an individual simply by
enacting a statute declaring that such individual is presumed to be jointly and severally
liable based on a presumption that the individual engaged in certain acts. This could
never be the law.
A state legislature's powers are not and should not be as broad as Appellants
suggest. The concept of "minimum contacts" not only protects defendants from the
burden of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum, but it also "ensure[s] that the
States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their
status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). In other words, "personal jurisdiction has
constitutional dimensions, and regardless of policy goals, [the legislature] cannot override
the due process clause, the source of protection for non-resident defendants." American
Tel. & Tel. Co.. 94 F.3d at 591.
Thus, even if Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4) and § 61-1-26 purport to confer
jurisdiction based on presumptive liability alone (and they do not), constitutional due
process mandates operate to negate the effect of those sections.

D.

This Court's Exercise Of Jurisdiction Over Taylor Would Be Inherently
Unfair.
Even if this Court finds that Taylor purposely established minimum contacts

within Utah (which he did not), that finding would not end the analysis. In addition to
the minimum contacts analysis set forth above, "the determination of whether Utah can
justify asserting jurisdiction over defendants hinges on the balancing of the fairness to the
parties and the interests of the state in assuming jurisdiction." SII MegaDiamond, 969
P.2d at 435; see Synergetics, 701 P.2d at 1110; Brown v. Cames Corp., 611 P.2d 378,
380 (Utah 1980). These factors strongly favor a finding that the exercise of jurisdiction
over Taylor would not comport with fair play and substantial justice.
1.

The Burden On Taylor To Litigate In Utah Is Great.

Taylor would labor under a heavy burden if he were forced to litigate this matter
in Utah, over 2,000 miles from his home. See Parry v. Ernst Home Ctr. Corp., 779 P.2d
659, 668 (Utah 1989) (noting that a "non-resident defendant faces substantial
inconvenience in litigating in a foreign forum")- This is a complex civil matter brought
by numerous large corporations and entities. Taylor, in contrast, is an individual, and
fairness dictates that he should not be forced to defend himself in a complex multi-party
action far from home.
Moreover, many if not most of the pertinent witnesses and documents are located
in South Carolina, the state of Safety-Kleen's home office. This matter is likely to
generate a significant volume of written discovery, and trigger extensive deposition
testimony. Taylor's ability to attend depositions and protect his rights through direct
participation in his defense is severely constrained by the distance between his home and

Appellants' proposed forum. The burden placed on Taylor to meaningfully participate in
his defense in such a remote forum is substantial, and places him at a severe
disadvantage. Appellants do not suggest anything to the contrary.
2.

Utah's Interest In This Matter Is Slight.

Utah has little real interest in this action. None of the Appellants are incorporated
in Utah. (RA 21, ff 4-9.) None of the Appellants maintain their principal places of
business in Utah. (Id.) Thus, none of the parties to this action have any real connection
to Utah sufficient to give Utah a meaningful interest in litigating Appellants' claims. The
fact that the Bonds were issued in Utah, by a subdivision of the state, does not weigh in
favor of jurisdiction over Taylor. This dispute centers on LESI's financial condition and
on the Appellants' bond holdings. Utah is not a party to the dispute, and the litigation
does not impact the policy behind the statutory provisions creating the Bonds. Thus, the
issuance of the Bonds by a Utah governmental entity adds nothing to Utah's interest in
litigating this matter.
Tellingly, the Appellants' tenuous assertion of venue in Tooele County is based
upon the Indenture of Trust, an agreement to which Taylor is not even a party. (RA 2221, Tf 3.) Although venue is not at issue here, Appellants' reliance on the Indenture of
Trust to set this matter in Utah is evidence of the remoteness of Utah's interest in this
action. Taylor, who is not a party to the Indenture of Trust and not bound by the venue
provision, should not be forced to litigate this matter in Utah based upon this dubious
connection to Utah.
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3.

Appellants' Interest In Obtaining Relief Does Not Support Utah
Jurisdiction.

Appellants' interests in obtaining relief do not militate toward a finding that
jurisdiction over Taylor in Utah would be fair. Appellants could just as easily litigate this
action in an appropriate forum where jurisdiction could be had over Taylor. Appellants
cannot show that similar relief is unavailable under the substantive law of another forum,
or by the application of that forum's choice of law rules. Moreover, Appellants are all
foreign to Utah, which further hampers the importance of their desire to seek relief in a
remote forum. In short, Appellants' apparent desire to bring this action in Utah in order
to obtain relief under Utah's securities laws is not consistent with fair play and substantial
justice.
4.

Judicial Efficiency Does Not Support Jurisdiction.

This matter is in its infancy. To date, Utah has invested relatively few judicial
resources towards the prosecution of this matter. Given this relatively small investment
of judicial resources, there is no compelling reason for this Court to continue to allow
Appellants to litigate this claim in Utah. Moreover, Appellants cannot show that
dismissal of this action would result in the underlying issues being litigated in multiple
fora. The most appropriate forum for this action is South Carolina, and there is no
impediment to Appellants litigating their claims there. Judicial efficiency supports a
finding that exercise of jurisdiction over Taylor is not reasonable.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Appellants confuse jurisdictional issues with liability issues. They ignore the due
process requirements at the very heart of any jurisdictional analysis, set forth by the

United States Supreme Court and Utah Supreme Court. Regardless of the potential scope
of liability for Taylor under Utah's securities laws, Utah courts lack personal jurisdiction
over Taylor because the exercise of such jurisdiction over him would not comport with
due process. Taylor's only connection with Utah stems from his corporate acts as an
agent of LESI and/or Safety-Kleen - acts that have nothing whatsoever to do with the
alleged misrepresentations forming the basis of this lawsuit.
Moreover, Appellants do not and cannot dispute that forcing Taylor to defend
himself in Utah would seriously prejudice Taylor, and would not serve any legitimate
purpose since the Appellants, too, are foreign to Utah, and Utah has only a slight interest
in this matter.
Accordingly, Taylor respectfully requests that the Court affirm the trial court's
dismissal of the complaint against him for lack of personal jurisdiction.
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